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With this paper we aim to contribute to the discussion about the difficulties that occur when trading technical 
knowledge and particularly patents. Currently one can observe that markets for technology have been sizable 
growing, transaction obstacles are still immanent and technology market intermediaries (TMI) emerge that develop 
new models aiming to facilitate Intellectual Property (IP) transactions. Why TMIs emerge and how they attempt to 
facilitate IP transactions however is not yet sufficiently understood. We propose theoretical explanations for these 
two questions building primarily on the contributions of Stigler (1951) and Williamson (1979). We argue that the 
growing markets for technologies on the one hand and immanent transaction obstacles on the other hand lead to 
further division of labor and thus foster the emergence of TMIs. Following Williamson (1979) we propose that the 
new transaction models developed by TMIs attempt to implement more standardized governance structures in order 
to diminish transaction costs. However it remains to be seen which of the newly developed models (or those to 
come) will survive and actually deliver more economic transactions.  
Please note: The reader may excuse the extensive use of  footnotes. 
 
 
How IP Transactions support Innovation 
Following the introduction of the ‘innovation 
concept’ in the economic literature by Schumpeter 
(2006) in 1911, nowadays firms have widely 
recognized that innovation is substantial not only to 
create and sustain a competitive advantage.1 In order 
                                                           
1 It is widely accepted that innovation has a substantial impact on 
economic growth. According to Carlsson and Eliasson (2003, p.1) 
“…economic growth results from the interaction of a variety of 
actors who create and use technology and demanding customers.” 
Various countries (including the EU) have adopted innovation 
policies to support the interaction of the actors in their innovation 
systems. In the economics literature this trend is reflected 
particularly by the ‘evolutionary economics’ that follow the idea of 
Schumpeter treating innovation as an endogenous growth variable 
to create continuous growth firms have adopted 
innovation strategies and developed sophisticated 
management approaches to systematically and 
efficiently create innovation.2   
                                                                                    
according to Gilbert and Katz (2007). On the contrary, as well the 
neo-classical economics accepted innovation although as 
exogenous growth variable. For a detailed elaboration of 
innovation in neo-classical economic growth models see e.g. 
Baumol (2002).  
2 While various definitions for innovation exist we understand 
innovation as defined by OECD (2005, p.46) as the 
“implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good 
or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method in business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations.” Different typologies for © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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When firms have recognized the increased 
importance to continuously innovate, at the same 
time they are pressed by shortening development and 
product life cycles while products are characterized by 
increasing technical complexity.3 These developments 
make it merely economically impossible for a single 
firm to internally develop all technologies necessary 
for a product and particularly the IPRs required to 
enable freedom-to-operate in order to prevent costly 
litigation.4  
At the same time, various firms often undertake 
redundant research. If firms could assess 
technologies they need that were already developed 
by other market actors they could innovate more 
economically, wherefore an increasing number of 
firms is opening up their innovation processes5 
beyond the own firm boundaries. Particularly if 
innovation is understood as a cumulative, dynamic 
process6 where firms assemble ‘pieces’ of 
                                                                                    
innovation exist, e.g. Granstrand (2000). Aside the existence of 
innovation in variety of domains (e.g. process, financial, social, 
service) we focus particular on technical product innovation, 
particularly those that can be protected by patents. For a review of 
the development of research on innovation and particularly on 
innovation processes during the last decades see e.g. Fagerberg and 
Verspagen (2009), Xu, Chen et al. (2007), Herstatt and Verworn 
(2004), Rothwell (1994). 
3 Lichtenthaler (2005), referring to Cesaroni, Gambardella et al. 
(2004), Granstrand (2004), Chesbrough (2003) and Grindley and 
Teece (1997) argued that the increasing technological content of 
products accompanied by shorter product and technology life 
cycles and more intense competition have encouraged stronger 
external knowledge exploitation. He argued that this ‘knowledge 
push effect’ has been intensified by a growing knowledge 
convergence and fusion, which have led to higher numbers of 
knowledge components from different areas being incorporated 
into a single product. According to Granstrand (2000, p.9) 
“products and services become not only increasingly based on new 
technologies, but increasingly based on many different 
technologies. That is, products and services become more multi-
technological, or ‘mul-tech’.” 
4 This issue is known and discussed in the literature under the 
notion ‘IP assembly problem’ e.g. by Granstrand (2003, p.59), who 
argued that “intellectual property rights to sustain a business 
become increasingly fragmented among players.”  
5 Parker et al (1996) noted that the high cost of internal R&D had 
encouraged companies to turn to independent inventors. 
Moreover, companies who intentionally or unintentionally find that 
their internal R&D efforts are limited to line extensions  and 
marketing can gain access to the breakthrough ideas created by 
inventors who are not confined to the corporate context. More 
recently, Quinn (2000) highlighted the wisdom of outsourcing 
innovation. Rigby and Zook (2002) also argued for taking an ‘open 
market’ approach to innovation, which includes actively seeking 
inventions from external sources. 
6 According to Powell and Snellman (2004) our economy is 
increasingly reliant on the production, refinement, and 
accumulation of ideas. Murray and O’Mahony (2007, p.1008) 
argued that “for innovation to occur…innovators must have the 
ability to actually combine or accumulate knowledge.” Green and 
Scotchmer (1995, p.20) noted that “knowledge and technical 
progress are cumulative in the sense that products are often the 
result of several steps of invention, modification, and 
improvement.” Aghion, Harris et al. (2001, p.470) argued along the 
lines of Harris and Vickers (1987) and Budd, Harris et al. (1993) 
complementary technical know-how (tacit and 
explicit) as well as IP assets7, it becomes obvious that 
firms can innovate more economically if these 
‘pieces’ could be acquired from different sources no 
matter whether they come from insight the own firm 
(including other business units) or from other market 
actors outside the own firm’s boundaries (e.g. other 
firms, universities, independent inventors).8 To limit 
the effect ever increasing product development costs 
firms have recognized that one might quicker and / 
or cheaper in-license technologies than developing 
them on its own. 
An example are technologies that are actively used by 
their inventors but need to be embedded into other 
firms’ products because they have been established as 
an industry standard. Those technologies can be 
acquired e.g. in-licensed or purchased to avoid 
redundant R&D. Even SMEs and start-ups might be 
acquired by large technology based firms and 
integrated into the own operations more 
economically than developing their technologies 
again.  
At the same time certain technologies of the firm’s 
own technology portfolio might be beneficial for 
other firms. Although a firm’s ‘willingness-to-exploit’ 
(e.g. license or sale) might differ across technologies 
in the portfolio due to the fact that each technology 
could serve a different (strategic) purpose.9 To 
                                                                                    
that “technological progress as emerging from a dynamic process 
of “step-by-step” innovation” and noted that in Schumpeterian 
(i.e. evolutionary) economics growth models innovation is often 
modelled as a “step-by-step” concept. According to Pénin (2008) 
similar concepts discussed in the literature are ‘step-by-step 
innovation’, ‘multi-invention products’, ‘sequential innovation’ and 
‘collective mode of innovation’. Already Schmookler (1966, p.vii) 
indicated the cumulative nature of technical knowledge for 
inventions as “the ‘bits’ that are added to the existing stock of 
knowledge.” The cumulative nature of innovation has further been 
subject to research in relation to the policy debate concerning 
optimal patent breadth e.g. by Scotchmer (1991), Green and 
Scotchmer (1995), Chang (1995), O'Donoghue (1998) and 
Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998). 
7 When understand ‘technology’ as an assembly of those three 
elements to enable a technical purpose. The dichotomy of tacit and 
explicit knowledge has been introduced by Polanyi (1966). Rather 
more generically technology can be understood as defined by 
Schmookler (1966), i.e. as “the social pool of knowledge of the 
industrial arts. Any piece of technological knowledge available to 
someone anywhere is included in this pool by definition.” 
8 This understanding of innovation through external technology 
sourcing is not particular new. Already Teece (1989, p.35) argued 
that “the institutional structure of innovation in capitalist 
economies is extremely variegated and involves a complex network 
of backward, forward, horizontal, lateral relationships and linkages 
within, among and between firms and other organizations…”   
Somaya and Teece (2001) argued that “inventions may be 
combined in such multi-invention products using three alternative 
organizational modes – viz., licensing of inventions, trade in 
components that embody inventions, or by integrated production.”  
9 While technologies directly related to a firm’s core competences 
and competitive advantage might not be allowed for ETE - or at 
least not to direct competitors - other technologies might not be © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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develop certain technologies firms might have spent 
resources although these technologies are not used at 
all by their inventors.10 At least for those technologies 
firms can generate additional revenues to increase its 
R&D return ratio11 through external exploitation. 
However, when an increasing number of firms12 
started to become increasingly outward oriented and 
to adapt what is often labelled the ‘open innovation’ 
approach those firms feel the need to establish 
competences for an effective and efficient IP 
management particularly focused outside the own 
firm, i.e. on the management of IP transactions and 
external relationships with other market actors.13 
Firms thus face the need to acquire dedicated 
knowledge and competences about the management 
                                                                                    
critical to the firm’s competitive advantage and very well suit for 
external exploitation. For different strategic purposes of 
technologies within technology portfolios the reader might refer to 
e.g. Tschirky and Koruna (1998, chapter 4.2.10) who presented 
different typologies and approaches to classify technologies. 
10 It is a common assumption that along the innovation process the 
market actor who files for patent protection of a technical 
invention is the same who ultimately exploits the patented 
invention on the market turning it into an innovation. Empirical 
evidence proves that this is not the case. A dominant share of 
patents is not used directly by its inventors. Gambardella, Giuri et 
al. (2006) reported that 36% of the patents in there ‘huge’ sample 
of EU patents are not used internally or for licensing. While about 
one half of these patents (18.7%) may even assume a potentially 
high value as they help block competitors, the other half (17.4%) 
labelled ‘sleeping patents’ are left virtually unexploited. The Institut 
der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (2006) proved that in Germany 
each fourth patent (24.6%) is not used at all. Chesbrough (2006, 
p . 5 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  “ U S  over 95% of issued patents are 
unlicensed, and over 97% never generate any royalties.” 
11 Bessy and Brousseau (1998, p.452) argued that “when an 
innovator is allowed to license his technology, he spreads it in the 
economic system, while at the same time he increases his return on 
innovation investments and efforts.” 
12 Among the most cited cases is IBM. According to Shulman 
(2003) and Lang (2001) IBM’s licensing revenues accounted for 
20% of their total profits in 1999 and in the last decade in total for 
almost 8.2 b€. As another example Dow Chemicals is often cited. 
According to Roos, Edvinsson et al. (1997), the company set up an 
‘Intellectual Asset Function’ in 1993 and obtained licensing 
revenues of 110 M€ in 2000 compared to 22 M€ in 1994. Another 
example is the Denmark-based healthcare firm Novo Nordisk A/S. 
According to Reitzig (2004) the firm built a dominant market 
position in Europe with diabetes drugs as the result of its license 
on a technology for manufacturing insulin from animal sources. 
13 In the 1990s and early 21st century many firms had realized the 
value of IP as corporate assets and their contribution to 
innovation. From 197 survey responses and 30 interviews with 
senior executives in the five principal regions across the world 
PWC (2007) reported that above 80% of all surveyed top manager 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that IP management 
is important to the success of the company. By today various firms 
have already shifted from a purely legally focused approach to 
administer patents towards an active IP management perceiving 
patents as economic assets and various IP management approaches 
have been developed, although primarily focused on internal 
processes (e.g. by Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996), Sullivan (2000), 
Teece (2000) and Reitzig (2004).  
of external exploitation14 (as well as acquisition) of 
technologies and particularly patents.15  
According to Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2006) the 
management approaches developed so far are still in 
its ‘infancy’. Firms face many obstacles when 
managing IP transactions. Aside from internal 
obstacles related to management processes and firms’ 
innovation cultures (e.g. not-invented-here-
syndrome)16, valuation difficulties to assess market 
prices, identifying buyers, etc.) further obstacles relate 
to the management of inter-firm relations, the nature 
of technologies (and patents) as traded assets and the 
institutional structures of the markets for 
technologies17 on which transactions commonly take 
place. The many obstacles ultimately result in high 
transaction costs lowering the firms’ incentives to 
engage into technology trade thus preventing the 
efficient creation of innovation.18 
To conclude, nowadays in industrial practice senior 
management has realized the importance of 
innovation. In order to maintain competitiveness in 
the innovation game and generate sustainable firm 
growth, an increasing number of firms attempts to 
exchange technologies within collaborations and 
networks outside the own firm’s boundaries, i.e. 
opens up their innovation processes. While on the 
one hand firms increasingly source technologies from 
other market actors through ‘external technology 
acquisition’ on the other hand  firms increasingly 
exploit own technologies outside the own firm’s 
boundaries to other markets actors in need for 
                                                           
14 In the literature various terms are used for essentially similar 
processes. These include ‘deployment’ e.g. by Escher (2005) and 
‘commercialization’ e.g. by Lichtenthaler (2006).  
15 For example, Sheehan, Martinez et al. (2004) showed that 
compared with 10 years ago, the importance of out-licensing has 
grown in 51.4% of their surveyed companies. Furthermore, 63% 
of the respondents in their study expect this trend to continue and 
anticipate that out-licensing of patented inventions become more 
important for their companies in the next five years. This 
expectation is confirmed as well by the survey of PWC (2007) who 
reported that 54% or their respondents expect a growing 
importance of out-licensing in the next three to five years.  
16 For further reading about the NIH-syndrome see e.g. 
Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2006). 
17 Various terms are used by different scholars often in an almost 
similar meaning. Chesbrough (2006) used the term ‘markets for IP’, 
Gambardella, Giuri et al. (2007) used the term ‘market for patents’, 
Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2006) used the term ‘market for 
knowledge’, and Gu and Lev (2000) used the term ‘markets in 
intangibles’. The use of different terminology further indicates the 
absence of clear and commonly accepted definitions in this field. 
Although we specifically focus on ‘markets for patents’ few solid 
research can be found on this specific term with one exception 
being Troy and Werle (2008). Thus we apply the term ‘markets for 
technology’ as used by most scholars in this field including A. 
Gambardella, O. Granstrand and D. Harhoff. 
18 According to Escher (2005, p.75) “companies often fail to 
initiate such an exploitation program due to market imperfections 
and high initial financial commitments.” © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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them.19 With firms’ increasing activities to source and 
exploit technologies outside the own boundaries, the 
importance of IP in general and of its efficient trade 
on the markets for technologies is gaining 
importance. Firms feel the need to manage the 
transactions and relationships with different market 
actors particular along the later stages of the 
innovation process.20 However, those transactions are 
still characterized by various obstacles prohibiting 
efficient market clearing through high transaction 
costs.  
Thus, in order to develop innovation more 
economically IP transactions need to ensure a better 
resource allocation to efficiently match those market 
actors owning technologies and patents with the 
actors who possess the necessary complementary 
resources to exploit the patented inventions into 
innovation.  
 
Growing Markets for Technology, Transaction 
Obstacles and the Emergence of Intermediaries  
Although markets to exchange technologies and IP 
have existed for decades21 empirical data from various 
sources indicates that they have grown sizably just 
recently since the 1990s22, especially in some high-
technology areas.23 Arora, Fosfuri et al. (2001, p.40) 
                                                           
19 As early as Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) suggested a 
typology for technology acquisition and exploitation strategies, 
followed by a period of intense academic writings on IP acquisition 
throughout the 1990s (e.g. Granstrand (2004)), it took until 2003 
when Chesbrough (2003) labelled the concept ‘open innovation’ 
any a wider range of firms realized the importance to open up 
innovation processes. Following few successful firms like P&G 
nowadays firms act in wide networks trying to source ideas and IP 
for new products and newly developed technologies from external 
parties including universities, other firms (including start-ups), 
leading clients and individual ‘lead users’ (see e.g. Herstatt and 
E.v.Hippel (1998)). According to Murray and O’Mahony (2007, 
p.1008) “with a shift toward ‘open innovation’ … contributors to 
innovations are more likely to come from different types of 
organizations (e.g. Powell, Koput et al. (1996), Owen-Smith and 
Powell (2003)) and across individual and firm units of analysis 
(Rosenkopf, Metiu et al. (2001)).”  
20 In the early stages of the innovation process rather ideas are 
exchanged than technologies. Cf. e.g. Herstatt (2007). 
21 Even at the beginning of the 20th century organized markets for 
technology have existed according to the extensive study by 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1998). Just when Arora, Fosfuri et al. 
(2001) published their comprehensive data compilation on this 
topic, the phenomena started to attract attention from a wider 
range of scholars as well as policy makers likewise. 
22 To explain the reasons behind the growth effect is out of the 
focus of our study and remains an open question so far.  
23 E.g. pharma firms rely extensively on outside knowledge for their 
products according to Ceccagnoli, Graham et al. (2009). However, 
we like to note that the size of the markets for technology, 
respectively for intangible assets, patents and licensing remains 
difficult to determine. Besides the absence of solid measures to 
systematically collect data, few studies have tried to approximate 
the market size and so far only few official statistics are collected 
by international authorities e.g. EUROSTAT on a regular basis. 
compared estimates at an aggregated level from three 
different data sources, which were “subject to 
numerous caveats” but rather led to consistent 
results. Limiting their analysis to technological 
knowledge, their estimates indicated annual 
worldwide markets for technology in the range of 
US$ 35-50 billion in 2000. In addition, Elton, Shah et 
al. (2002) and Kline (2003) estimated that the overall 
US patenting licensing revenues have ‘skyrocketed’ 
from below US$ 15 billion per year at the beginning 
of the 1990s to around US$ 100 billion a year in 
2002. Results from a survey by Sheehan, Martinez et 
al. (2004) indicated that the majority of 81% or the 
responding companies expected an increasing 
number of out-licensing transactions from 2005 to 
2010, while 54% of the respondents have 
experienced a growth of out-licensing since 1995. A 
recent study by Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft 
Köln (2006) estimated that the German market for 
technology has a potential size of € 8 billion. 
Gambardella, Giuri et al. (2006) estimated that the 
market for the EU-8 countries was € 9.4 billion in 
1994-1996, 12.7 in 1997-1999, and 15.6 in 2000-2002, 
which corresponds to 0.16%, 0.19%, and 0.20% of 
the GDP, and a total growth between the third and 
the first period of 65%. According to Gambardella, 
Giuri et al. (2006, p.V) “the total value of patents 
licensed has increased considerably in these industries 
in the 1990s, suggesting that the markets for 
technology in these sectors are growing at a 
significant pace.” Athreye and Cantwell (2007) have 
compared the growth of non-US patens and 
worldwide licensing receipts a n d  c a m e  t o  c o n c l u d e  
that the growth of patenting coincided with the 
growth of markets for technology after 1980s. 
Moreover, the growth can be expected to continue in 
the future. Gambardella, Giuri et al. (2006) estimated 
that the market for technology in Europe could be 
larger by 50%, i.e. the potential has grown from US$ 
14.8 to US$ 24.4 billion. The potential market 
suggests that there are notable untapped 
opportunities for enhancing the market for patents in 
Europe, and correspondingly for using this means in 
order to increase the rate of utilization of patents. 
Other scattered evidence indicates further the 
growing importance of intangible assets, IP and 
patents in particular. The evidence includes reports 
of extensive licensing revenues of few large 
companies, on the forefront IBM as often quoted 
example.24  
                                                           
24 While among the top patent holders in the world, its licensing 
revenues until 1993 amounted to approximately $300 million a 
year. This changed drastically in 1993 when under the newly 
appointed CEO Lou Gerstner, IBM embarked on an aggressive 
licensing programme that he expected to yield US$1.4 to US$ 1.5 
billion in 2000 according to (Salomon Smith Barney report on © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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Furthermore, the dynamics in the market for 
technology are illustrated by the controversial 
discussions about the abuse of the patent system 
appearing from enormously huge litigation cases 
particularly in the US25 but to some extent as well in 
Europe were ‘patent trolls’ recently have filed 
infringement cases against large firms pressing for 
damages and licensing royalties.26  
However most of the studies that were conducted to 
better understand technology trade on firm level 
either from the seller (e.g. Lichtenthaler (2006), 
Escher (2005)) or the buyer perspective (e.g. 
Granstrand, Bohlin et al. (1992)) or on national level 
(e.g. Gambardella (2002), Granstrand (2004)) came to 
similar conclusions. The market constellation, 
including the traded good and the institutional 
structure are today far from optimal. Many obstacles 
are still present that inhibit markets to clear 
efficiently.  
According to Troy and Werle (2008, p.3) the “well-
functioning market for patented new technological 
knowledge is confronted with several obstacles 
knowledge” and the “markets are far from 
functioning smoothly.” Teece (1998, p.545), referring 
to his early work Teece (1981) noted that already 
almost 20 years earlier he had recognized the “first 
signs for an emerging market for know-how”, 
however at the same time had stated that “much 
technology does not enter it … either because the 
firm is unwilling to sell or because of difficulties in 
transacting in the market for know-how.” Teece 
(1998, p.62) still noted similar circumstances, i.e. that 
“the market for know-how is riddled with 
imperfections…” and “one class of assets that is 
especially difficult, although not impossible, to trade 
involves knowledge assets.”  
Furthermore, recently on the markets for technology 
the emergence of a new type of specialized market 
                                                                                    
IBM, June 22, 1999). Given the substantially higher gross margin 
on licensing revenues than on other kinds of IBM revenues, the 
contribution to the bottom line of patent royalties can be regarded 
as considerably larger than those of other revenue sources. Thus, 
while IBM’s royalty revenues represent about 1.5% of its 2000 total 
revenues, royalty income accounts for about 13% of IBM's pretax 
net income. Cf. Gu and Lev (2001) 
25 Various examples exist, e.g. in late 2001, Research in Motion 
(RIM), the Blackberry manufacturer was sued by the ‘non-
manufacturing entity’ NTP for infringing on its patents “covering 
the use of radio frequency wireless communications in e-mail 
systems.” In 2006, the case was settled RIM paying US$ 612.5 
million to NTP. In another high profile patent case, Intel reached a 
US$ 525 million settlement of a suit alleging that Intel’s Pentium 
family of microprocessors infringed Intergraph’s patents. Cf. 
Gilbert and Katz (2007). 
26 In 2008 one of the first high-number infringement cases started 
in Europe when IP-Com sued Nokia at the German patent court 
in Mannheim for infringing about 1,000 patents of about 150 
patent families. IP-Com, who bought the patents in 2006 from 
Robert Bosch GmbH and claims € 12 billion damages.  
actors, which we label technology market 
intermediaries (TMI) could have been observed.27  
OECD, BMWI et al. (2005, p.10) pointed out that 
recently “market intermediaries have become more 
numerous and diverse as demand for technology 
transfer and patent valuation have grown.” According 
to the EPO, OECD et al. (2006, p.1) “the IP 
marketplace is nowadays in a probe and learn period 
where the number of intermediaries is rising.” EPO, 
OECD et al. (2006) drew further attention to the 
raise of new business models which those 
intermediaries apply. Examples of TMI models 
mentioned in that study include partnerships or 
technology pools to special purpose investments 
vehicles, auctions, publicly traded IP indexes as well 
as patent value funds which aim at taking care of IP 
logistics issues (e.g. finding and negotiating with 
potential licensees) whilst filling in the financial gap 
needed to allow the necessary managerial efforts 
preceding the commercialization of new products, i.e. 
identifying potential licensors, establishing contacts 
and negotiating with them up to the closing of a 
transaction. According to EPO, OECD et al. (2006, 
p.1) these new models “make one step forward 
towards the development of a market for IP transfers 
…[and]… contribute to the maturation of the IP 
market.”  
Aside from governmental organizations, scholars 
from this field have as well recognized this trend. 
Koruna (2001) observed that with new services and 
instruments on the market the process of externally 
exploiting technologies is getting easier and thus will 
probably also gain more acceptance among 
companies. Chesbrough (2006, p.3) reported “that a 
small number of intermediary firms have arisen in 
recent years to assist in the process of identification, 
negotiation, and transfer of patents from one firm to 
another.” Troy and Werle (2008, p.20) noted that “the 
number of intermediaries is growing, as is the 
propensity of firms to employ specialized intellectual 
property professionals. These and other actors 
potentially involved in patent transactions gain 
trading experience, experiment with different modes 
of trade, and invent ways to cope with uncertainty.”28  
                                                           
27 We define TMIs based on an extensive literature review as 
“private firms specialized in intellectual property that provide 
services to primarily technology based firms in order to facilitate 
the external exchange of intangible assets, predominantly without 
adding value or holding property of the asset, excluding services 
provided typically by patent law firms (e.g. all services related to the 
patent application procedures and patent litigation court cases).” 
Thus, our definition focuses on private firms and excludes 
government support vehicles and TTOs set up by universities as 
well as patent law firms offering their ‘classical’ legal services (e.g. 
patent filing, prosecution and litigation). 
28 We like to note that the emergence of intermediaries is not 
special to markets for technology when markets do not clear © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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However, few statistics were available to us 
documenting this trend by strengthening the 
anecdotal evidence. Therefore we collected own data 
throughout a pre-study in December 2006. Based on 
interviews with a range of industry experts we 
identified about 70 TMIs with the growth rate of 
those firms measured by the year of their foundation. 
Our results confirm the trend. An approximated 
exponential curve fit indicates an annual ‘birth rate’ 
of 8% of TMIs appearing on the markets for 
technology starting from 1980.29  
An example for a recently developed model to 
facilitate IP transactions is the public patent auction 
model. After in spring 2006 the first widely 
recognized public multilot patent auction took place 
in San Francisco, US This model has gained particular 
interest30 not only in the community of IP experts. 
Since then at least twice a year those auctions were 
held not only in the US but also in Europe and Asia. 
Sales generated through six auctions between spring 
2005 and autumn 2007 accumulated to more than € 
30 million.  
 
Explaining recent Trends 
Having observed the recent growth of the markets 
for technology, the still persisting transaction 
obstacles and the emergence of TMIs we were 
                                                                                    
efficiently. E.g. in agricultural markets Klerkx and Leeuwis (2008, 
p.260) reported that “due to market and systemic failures, both 
supply side and demand side parties in this market have 
experienced constraints in effecting transactions and establishing 
the necessary relationships to engage in demand-driven innovation 
processes. To mitigate these constraints, a field of intermediary 
organizations has emerged to assist agricultural entrepreneurs to 
articulate demand, forge linkages with those that can provide 
innovation support services, and manage innovation processes. 
29 Counting for 80% of the TMIs, by for the majority of the TMIs 
seem to be based in the US clustering around two centres at the 
west and east coasts. While a considerable number of them are 
concentrated around Silicon Valley at the west coast, another 
cluster is concentrated at the east cost including New York and 
Massachusetts. The TMIs that are not based in the US are mainly 
European and Canadian firms. In Europe the British and Germans 
encounter the majority. Several TMIs hold regional offices in 
Europe, Japan, China and East Asia. A description of the sample 
can be found in Tietze and Barreto (2007). Founding dates could 
be identified for only 60 TMIs of the whole sample. 
30 Auctions, as one of the oldest negotiation mechanisms, appear 
suitable to trade assets in various fields and in multiple contexts. 
Traditionally, among the most prominent assets traded via auctions 
are art, antiques and wines. However, in recent years auctions have 
been applied for an increasing range of tangible (e.g. second hand 
industrial machinery to third world countries, real estate properties, 
see e.g. Azasu (2006), Shenkar and Arikan (2006)) but as well for 
intangible assets, including e.g. various types of services (e.g. 
craftsmen services for house repair, travel services, software 
developer services, problem solving services) or IP assets (e.g. 
patents, 3G licences, see e.g. Klemperer (2004), Milgrom (2005)). 
Furthermore, McClure (2008, p.102) argued that “the current wave 
of activity in the IPR market. IPR auctions have attempted to 
commoditize IPRs.” 
interested to understand why TMIs actually emerge 
and how they impact IP transactions. In the following 
we propose an explanation attempting to explain the 
emergence of TMIs on the one hand and propose an 
explanation of how TMIs attempt to facilitate IP 
transactions and thus contribute to more economical 
creation of innovation. 
 
Why TMIs Emerge  
In order to explain the emergence of TMIs, we 
believe that the notion of Stigler (1951) provides a 
valuable argumentation. Stigler (1951) formalized the 
Smithian notion that the specialization depends on 
the size of the market and thus provided a widely 
applied31 theoretical foundation with roots back to 
Smith (1776). Accordingly market growth can lead to 
further specialization of the division of labor, i.e. to 
the emergence of new market actors, e.g. 
intermediaries that specialize on certain dedicated 
tasks.32  
Within his seminal paper, Stigler (1951, p.142) defined 
the firm “not among the markets in which it buys 
inputs but among the functions or processes which 
constitute the scope of its activity.” Stigler (1951) 
argued that the different processes are characterized 
by different average cost functions, i.e. he 
differentiated among three types (‘falling 
continuously’, ‘rising continuously’ and 
‘conventionally U-shaped’). Similar processes are 
characterized by increasing or diminishing returns. 
Based on the respective cost and return structure, 
Stigler (1951, p.143) suggested that firms abandon 
“functions subject to diminishing returns… [where 
the]… cost of the final product does not diminish 
with output… allowing another firm (and industry) to 
specialize in them to take full advantage of increasing 
returns.”33 However, at any given time these 
functions, i.e. the sales of the product/service may be 
too small to support a specialized merchant; the 
output of a by-product may be too small to support a 
specialized fabricator; the demand for market 
information may be too small to support a trade 
journal. In these cases, the firm must then perform 
these functions for itself. However, Stigler (1951, 
p.188) argued that “with the expansion of the 
                                                           
31 On 26.08.2009, Google Scholar reported 1.118 citations of this 
paper.  
32 Coase (1937) had argued that firms emerge when transaction 
costs, a firm exists if the transaction costs are reduced compared to 
pure market coordination. Accordingly, an intermediary exists if its 
activities induce a reduction of transaction costs between the 
market actors, thus enhance the outcome of the market.  
33 This argumentation, i.e. a forward disintegration of certain 
processes to specialized firms appears to be the basic argument of 
what is known today as the concept of ‘outsourcing’. Cf. e.g. 
Akehurst (2008), Holcomb and Hitt (2007), Mahnke (2001). © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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industry, the magnitude of the function subject to 
increasing returns may become sufficient to permit a 
firm to specialize in performing it.” The firm will 
then abandon the process (disintegrate), and a new 
firm will take it over. Thus, throughout an industry 
development disintegration might appear during a 
growth phase and reintegration most likely during a 
decline phase.34  
We believe that we can apply the general theoretical 
argumentation provided by Stigler (1951) to explain 
the recent emergence of TMIs on the markets for 
technology.  
We have seen that currently three phenomena can be 
observed on the markets for technology where IP 
transactions are commonly conducted. Firstly, 
empirical evidence proves that currently, respectively 
since the last decade the markets for technology have 
been sizably growing. Secondly, evidence proves that 
firms encounter various obstacles within IP 
transactions. Among others uncertainty and 
asymmetric information lead to high transaction costs 
for IP transactions. Thirdly, we have observed the 
emergence of TMIs, as a new type of market actor 
that offer new services on the markets for 
technology.  
Following the notion of Stigler (1951) and the 
previously presented evidence we argue that the 
emergence of TMIs should be interpreted as a result 
of the first two phenomena.35    
The growth of the markets for technology is the 
basis for the argumentation. Following Stigler (1951, 
p.189) “vertical disintegration is the typical 
development in growing industries” so that 
“specialism of firms may take the form of 
transactioning with a narrower range of products as 
well as performing fewer functions of the same range 
of products.” Thus, we argue that recently the trade 
of IP and technical knowledge on the markets for 
technology appears to have reached a sufficient size 
to open up business opportunities for specialized 
firms. Those business opportunities constitute an 
                                                           
34 Since the early 1950s, the discussion of disintegration has carried 
on until today. Particularly since the mid 1990s with the increased 
performance of ICT and the globalisation in many industries 
“services previously undertaken in-house within organisations are 
outsourced to specialist firms” according to Akehurst (2008, p.6). 
Although today outsourcing is considered by many scholars to have 
driven the growth of business services (e.g. Martinelli (1991), Rajan 
and Pearson (1986)) the theory is not without critics and doubts. 
Some empirical studies have reaches inconsistent results (e.g. 
Bryson, Keeble et al. (1993), Levy (1984), Stuckey (1983), Tucker 
and Wilder (1977)) and e.g. Perry (1989) questioned the way Stigler 
had defined ‘specialization’. 
35 Although probability the relationship should not be understood 
as a unidirectional causal relationship. A more meaningful 
assumption would rather be that the causal relationship between 
these phenomena must be seen as mutual reinforcing. 
incentive large enough for TMIs to develop 
specialized business models for certain parts of IP 
transactions. This institutional change can thus be 
understood as vertical forward disintegration 
(outsourcing) of certain tasks of IP transactions, i.e. 
contracting with TMIs might be cheaper for the firms 
owning IP than performing those IP transactions 
completely with in-house resources.  
We argue further that this impact has a cyclical impact 
on the obstacles within IP transactions. Hopefully, 
depending on any specific ‘new’ transaction model, 
this impact will be positive in sum (i.e. lower overall 
obstacles) in order to facilitate IP transaction 
efficiency, having in mind that the nature of the ‘new’ 
transaction models might impose additional obstacles 
into IP transaction processes (e.g. particularly due to 
increased complexity and coordination efforts). 
Increasingly efficient transactions would then support 
f i r m s  t o  e x c h a n g e  I P  a s s e t s  m o r e  f r e q u e n t l y  a n d  
ultimately contribute to more efficient creation of 
innovation through a more economical exchange of 
technologies.  
However, it appears unlikely that firms will be able to 
abandon all process tasks they previously performed 
in-house. Referring to Stigler (1951), firms will 
preferably outsource those tasks that do not represent 
increasing returns or diminishing costs, but retain 
tasks which might include further the governance 
(coordination and communication) of the transaction 
process and tasks where the IP owner needs to 
deliver technical, economic and legal information 
about the technology (e.g. as input to the due 
diligence to potential buyer). The firm will only agree 
to the forward disintegration if either the earnings 
from successful transactions are significantly higher, 
the transaction success rate increases significantly or 
the transaction costs (including fees charged by 
TMIs) are significantly reduced. According to Stigler 
(1951, p.143) specialized firms “cannot charge a price 
for the process higher than the average cost of the 
process to the firms which are abandoning it.” Only 
if TMIs manage to prove a sustainable business case, 
their business model can survive in the long run. 
 
How TMIs impact IP Transactions 
Having proposed a possible explanation for the 
emergence of TMIs, we continue to propose an 
explanation of how TMIs attempt to make IP 
transactions more economically on the micro level of 
the firm. To explain the impact we believe that the 
argumentation provided by Williamson (1979, p.234) 
can be applied.  
Williamson (1979, p.239) argued that “governance 
structures - the institutional matrix within which 
transactions are negotiated and executed - vary with © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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the nature of the transaction.” According to 
Williamson (1979) the choice of the governance 
structure depends mainly on the asset specificity and 
the frequency of transaction of a traded asset. 
According to Williamson (1979) the crucial 
investment distinction is to what degree transaction-
specific (nonmarketable) expenses are incurred. 
Assets that are unspecialized among users pose few 
hazards, since buyers in these circumstances can 
easily turn to alternative sources, and suppliers can 
sell output intended for one order to other buyers 
without difficulty. Nonmarketability problems arise 
when the specific identity of the parties has 
important cost-bearing consequences. Williamson 
(1979) referred to transactions of this kind as 
‘idiosyncratic’. Occasionally even the identity of the 
parties is important from the outset, as when a buyer 
induces a supplier to invest in specialized physical 
capital of a transaction-specific kind. Inasmuch as the 
value of this capital in other uses is, by definition, 
much smaller than the specialized use for which it has 
been intended, the supplier is effectively ‘locked into’ 
the transaction to a significant degree. 
Williamson (1979, p.239) then concluded that that 
while “simple governance structures should be used 
in conjunction with simple contractual relations and 
complex governance structures reserved for complex 
relations seems generally sensible. Use of a complex 
structure to govern a simple relation is apt to incur 
unneeded costs, and use of a simple structure for a 
complex transaction invites strain.” Williamson (1979, 
p.247) then proposed a typology of governance 
structures. He considered three broad types of 
governance structures: non-transaction-specific, semi-
specific, and highly specific. The market is the classic 
non-specific governance structure within which 
“faceless buyers and sellers . . . meet ... for an instant 
to exchange standardized goods at equilibrium 
prices.” By contrast, highly specific structures are 
tailored to the special needs of the transaction. 
Identity here clearly matters. Semi-specific structures, 
naturally, fall in between. Thus, to a large extent the 
choice of any governance structure depends on the 
asset specificity, i.e. whether an asset is a commodity 
of highly specific. 36 
We argue that the emergence of TMIs, i.e. the 
institutional change on the markets for technology 
has an impact on the governance structures of IP 
transactions, i.e. that TMIs develop “alternative 
institutional modes for organizing transactions” 
according to Williamson (1979, p.234).  
Following the notion of Williamson (1979) patents 
must be understood as assets with a high specificity. 
Firstly, patents constitute an intangible asset, which 
                                                           
36 For a recent discussion of asset specificity see Ruzzier (2009). 
are usually harder to value than tangible assets. In 
addition their unique nature (i.e. patents must be 
novel to the world) make it even more difficult to 
value them what relates to the question of what can 
be patented, i.e. in order to be patentable a technical 
invention has to be novel, applicable and non 
obvious37 where patents can be granted on products 
(parts, applications, chemical substances, etc.) or 
processes (production processes, etc.)38. Thus, Reitzig 
(2003, p.18) noted that “it is known that the value of 
a patent is highly idiosyncratic.” These patent 
characteristics are furthermore reflected by the 
characteristics reflected in the governance structures 
commonly employed when trading patents. 
Particularly due to the nature of patents, prior to the 
emergence of TMIs, following the notion of 
Williamson (1979) governance structures of IP 
transactions need to be understood as of 
idiosyncratic nature. Due to the various obstacles 
discussed earlier that permit efficient IP transactions 
over long time idiosyncratic governance structures 
had emerged to trade IP as economically as possible. 
Due to the high asset specificity of patents, most IP 
transactions were conducted in private, bilateral 
settings. These bilateral transactions allow for 
contracts to be individually adjusted to specific needs 
and requirements of the involved actors, i.e. as 
idiosyncratic transactions take the nature of relational 
contracts. 
We argue that the ‘new’ transaction models developed 
by TMIs attempt to facilitate IP transaction efficiency 
by shifting the governance towards more 
standardized non-specific or at least semi-specific 
structures. Taking patent auctions as one particular 
example for a new model developed by TMIs to 
facilitate IP transactions, we argue that two changes 
impact the nature of IP transactions when TMIs 
become involved. Firstly, the sellers and buyers of IP 
are not anymore directly connected. Thus the nature 
of the transaction becomes ‘indirect’ and in the case 
of auctions rather multilateral (involving various 
bidders) than bilateral. Secondly, auctions implement 
more standardized governance structures of IP 
transactions through the use of standardized legal 
frameworks (including standardized contracts with 
lump sump payments). Thus, patent auctions can be 
                                                           
37 In the US the invention has to be novel, non-trivial and has to 
have commercial application. 
38 Since the emergence of new matters as integral part of today’s 
GDP in many countries e.g. software, biotechnology on 
governmental level a discussion is currently ongoing whether other 
matters should be patentable as well. However, this issue is still 
controversial. In the U.S. software can be patented since 1981 and 
methods-of-doing-business (MDB) since 1998. In Europe 
however, software could not be patented until fall 2003 and MDB 
business patents are not accepted so far according to e.g. 
(Granstrand 2000) and Pitkethly (2001). © Frank Tietze, Cornelius Herstatt 2009 
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interpreted to employ at least semi-specific 
governance structures where highly specific assets are 
traded as ‘spot market transactions’ according to 
Williamson (1979). 
 
Part IV : Conclusions 
To summarize, recent market developments force 
technology based firms to continuously innovate. 
However, innovation is a cumulative process that 
increasingly requires the combination of internally 
developed technologies with externally acquired ones, 
particularly for increasingly complex products. Firms 
increasingly innovate openly to maximize their 
returns of R&D investments, wherefore efficient 
technology acquisition and external exploitation is 
becoming increasingly important.  
Although growing markets for technology indicate 
increasing technology trade activities, various 
obstacles still prohibit efficient transactions. The 
current status can therefore hardly be considered to 
be supportive to innovation and firm growth. 
Currently TMIs emerge as a new type of markets 
actors.  
The involvement of TMIs in IP transactions changes 
the nature of the transactions from ‘direct’ to 
‘indirect’. Furthermore, the new transaction models 
developed and offered by TMIs to technology based 
firms attempting to facilitate IP transactions by 
circumventing or diminishing the present transaction 
obstacles.  
The emergence of TMIs can be interpreted as 
institutional change, i.e. a forward disintegration of 
the IP owners who ‘outsource’ certain tasks to TMIs. 
This ‘new’ division of labor between IP owners,   
buyers and TMIs on market level has an impact on 
the governance structures of IP transactions on the 
micro level of the firm, i.e. how firms manage IP 
transactions. The argumentation of this paper 
comprising both these elements is illustrated in Figure 
1. 
For patent auctions we have argued that in spite of 
the obstacles inherent from the nature of patents and 
the protected technical inventions, the auction model 
attempts to shift the governance structures of 
‘classical’ IP transactions from highly specialized, 
individually designed ‘idiosyncratic’ transactions 
towards more standardized, ‘transactional’ 
governance structures in order to decrease 
transaction costs.  
How TMIs, and patent auctions as a particular model 
impact IP transactions and whether those contribute 
to more efficient market transactions remains to be 
seen and is further subject to our ongoing research 
where we attempt to derive implications for whom 
we believe are the main stakeholders, i.e. particularly 
top level management positions concerned with IP 
and innovation strategy of technology based firms, 
TMIs themselves, but further policy makers 
concerned with innovation policy and the academic 
community.  
Whether all types of patents can be traded though 
any of the newly developed transaction models - with 
the governance structures including transaction 
processes and contract designs - remains an open 
question. Indications at least exist that this might not 
be the case, but that some models, e.g. auctions are 
suitable only for certain types of patents. Thus, we 
will continue to investigate how patent auctions can 
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